Abstract. At Crypto'07, Goyal introduced the concept of Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption as a convenient tool to reduce the amount of trust in authorities in Identity-Based Encryption. In this model, if the Private Key Generator (PKG) maliciously re-distributes users' decryption keys, it runs the risk of being caught and prosecuted. Goyal proposed two constructions: the first one is efficient but can only trace well-formed decryption keys to their source; the second one allows tracing obfuscated decryption boxes in a model (called weak black-box model) where cheating authorities have no decryption oracle. The latter scheme is unfortunately far less efficient in terms of decryption cost and ciphertext size. The contribution of this paper is to describe a new construction that combines the efficiency of Goyal's first proposal with a very simple weak black-box tracing mechanism. The proposed scheme is presented in the selective-ID model but readily extends to meet all security properties in the adaptive-ID sense, which is not known to be true for prior black-box schemes.
Introduction
Identity-based cryptography, first proposed by Shamir [39] , alleviates the need for digital certificates used in traditional public-key infrastructures. In such systems, users' public keys are public identifiers (e.g. email addresses) and the matching private keys are derived by a trusted party called Private Key Generator (PKG). The first practical construction for Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was put forth by Boneh and Franklin [8] -despite the bandwidth-demanding proposal by Cocks [17] -and, since then, a large body of work has been devoted to the design of schemes with additional properties or relying on different algorithmic assumptions [23, 5, 6, 35, 41, 7, 21, 13, 9] .
In spite of its appealing advantages, identity-based encryption has not undergone rapid adoption as a standard. The main reason is arguably the fact that it requires unconditional trust in the PKG: the latter can indeed decrypt any ciphertext or, even worse, re-distribute users' private keys. The key escrow problem can be mitigated as suggested in [8] by sharing the master secret among multiple PKGs, but this inevitably entails extra communication and infrastructure. Related paradigms [20, 3] strived to remove the key escrow problem but only did so at the expense of losing the benefit of human-memorizable public keys: these models get rid of escrow authorities but both involve traditional (though not explicitly certified) public keys that are usually less convenient to work with than easy-to-remember public identifiers.
In 2007, Goyal [24] explored a new approach to deter rogue actions from authorities. With the Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption (A-IBE) primitive, if the PKG discloses a decryption key associated with some identity over the Internet, it runs the risk of being caught and sued by the user. A-IBE schemes achieve this goal by means of an interactive private key generation protocol between the user and the PKG. For each identity, there are exponentiallymany families of possible decryption keys. The key generation protocol provides the user with a single decryption key while concealing to the PKG the family that this key belongs to. From this private key, the user is computationally unable to find one from a different family. Hence, for a given identity, a pair of private keys from distinct families serves as evidence of a fraudulent PKG. The latter remains able to passively eavesdrop communications but is discouraged to reveal users' private keys. Also, users cannot falsely accuse an honest PKG since they are unable to compute a new key from a different family using a given key.
Prior Works. Two constructions were given in [24] . The first one (that we call Goyal -1 hereafter) builds on Gentry's IBE [21] and, while efficient, only allows tracing well-formed decryption keys. This white-box model seems unlikely to suffice in practice since malicious parties can rather release an imperfect and/or obfuscated program that only decrypts with small but noticeable probability. The second scheme of [24] (let us call it Goyal -2 ), which is constructed on the Sahai-Waters fuzzy IBE [35] , has a variant providing weak black-box traceability: even an imperfect pirate decryption box can be traced (based on its input/output behavior) back to its source although traceability is only guaranteed against dishonest PKGs that have no decryption oracle in the attack game. However, Goyal -2 is somewhat inefficient as decryption requires a number of pairing calculations that is linear in the security parameter. For the usually required security level, ciphertexts contain more than 160 group elements and decryption calculates a product of about 160 pairings.
Subsequently, Au et al. [4] described another A-IBE scheme providing retrievability (i.e., a property that prevents the PKG from revealing more than one key for a given identity without exposing its master key) but remained in the white-box model. More recently, Goyal et al. [25] modified the Goyal -2 system using attribute-based encryption techniques [35, 26] to achieve full black-box traceability: unlike Goyal -2 , the scheme of [25] preserves security against dishonest PKGs that have access to a decryption oracle in the model. While definitely desirable in practice, this property is currently achievable only at the expense of the same significant penalty as in Goyal -2 [24] in terms of decryption cost and ciphertext size.
Our Contributions. We present a very efficient and conceptually simple scheme with weak black-box traceability. We prove its security (in the standard model) under the same assumption as Goyal -2 . Decryption keys and ciphertexts consist of a constant number of group elements and their length is thus linear in the security parameter λ (instead of quadratic as in Goyal -2 ). Encryption and decryption take O(λ 3 )-time (w.r.t. O(λ 4 ) in Goyal -2 ) with only two pairing computations as for the latter (against more than 160 in .
While presented in the selective-ID security model (where adversaries must choose the identity that will be their prey at the outset of the game) for simplicity, our scheme is easily adaptable to the adaptive-ID model of [8] . In contrast, one of the security properties (i.e., the infeasibility for users to frame innocent PKGs) was only established in the selective-ID setting for known schemes in the black-box model (i.e., Goyal -2 and its fully black-box extension [25] ). Among such schemes, ours thus appears to be the first one that can be tweaked so as to achieve adaptive-ID security against dishonest users.
Our scheme performs almost as well as Goyal -1 (the main overhead being a long master public keyà la Waters [41] to obtain the adaptive-ID security). In comparison with the latter, that was only analyzed in a white-box model of traceability, our system provides several other advantages: -Its security relies on a weaker assumption. So far, the only fully practical A-IBE scheme was resting on assumptions whose strength grows with the number of adversarial queries, which can be as large as 2 30 as commonly assumed in the literature. Such assumptions are subject to a limited attack [16] that requires a careful adjustment of group sizes (by as much as 50% additional bits) to guarantee a secure use of schemes.
-It remains secure when many users want to run the key generation protocol in a concurrent fashion. Goyal -1 has a key generation protocol involving zeroknowledge proofs. As its security reductions require to rewind adversaries at each key generation query, security is only guaranteed when the PKG interacts with users sequentially. In inherently concurrent environments like the Internet, key generation protocols should remain secure when executed by many users willing to register at the same time. By minimizing the number of rewinds in reductions, we ensure that our scheme remains secure in a concurrent setting. In these regards, the key generation protocol of Goyal -2 makes use of oblivious transfers (OT) in sub-protocols. It thus supports concurrency whenever the underlying OT protocol does. As already mentioned however, our scheme features a much better efficiency than Goyal -2 .
-In a white-box model of traceability, it can be made secure against dishonest PKGs equipped with a decryption oracle 3 . In the following, we nevertheless focus on the (arguably more interesting) weak black-box traceability aspect.
As an extension to the proceedings version of this paper [31] , we also show how to apply the idea of our weak black-box tracing mechanism to Gentry's IBE. The resulting A-IBE system is obtained by bringing a simple modification to the key generation protocol of Goyal -1 so as to perfectly hide the user's key family from the PKG's view while preserving the efficiency of the whole scheme. Since the resulting system inherits the efficiency of Gentry's IBE and the Goyal -1 white-box A-IBE, it turns out to be the most efficient weakly black-box A-IBE construction to date. Its (adaptive-ID) security is moreover proved under a tight reduction (albeit under a strong assumption).
Finally, since detecting misbehaving PKGs is an equally relevant problem in IBE primitives and their generalizations, we show how the underlying idea of previous schemes can be applied to one of the most practical identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) realizations [10] . We also argue that the same technique similarly applies in the context of attribute-based encryption [35, 26] .
Organization. In the rest of the paper, section 2 recalls the A-IBE security model defined in [24] . We first analyze the white-box version of our scheme in section 3 and then describe a weak black-box tracing mechanism in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 describe and analyze the extensions of our method to Gentry's IBE and the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme, respectively.
Background and Definitions
Syntactic definition and security model. We recall the definition of A-IBE schemes and their security properties as defined in [24] . Definition 1. An Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption scheme (A-IBE) is a tuple (Setup, Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Trace) of efficient algorithms or protocols such that:
-Setup takes as input a security parameter and outputs a master public key mpk and a matching master secret key msk.
-Keygen
(PKG,U) is an interactive protocol between the public parameter generator PKG and the user U:
· the common input to PKG and U are: the master public key mpk and an identity ID for which the decryption key has to be generated; · the private input to PKG is the master secret key msk. Both parties may use a sequence of private coin tosses as additional inputs. The protocol ends with U receiving a decryption key d ID as his private output.
-Encrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, an identity ID and a message m and outputs a ciphertext.
-Decrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, a decryption key d ID and a ciphertext C and outputs a message. -Trace given the master public key mpk, a decryption key d ID , this algorithm outputs a key family number n F or the special symbol ⊥ if d ID is ill-formed.
Correctness requires that, for any outputs (mpk, msk) of Setup, any plaintext m and any identity ID, whenever d ID ← Keygen (PKG(msk),U) (mpk, ID), we have
The above definition is for the white-box setting. In a black-box model, Trace takes as input an identity ID, the corresponding user's well-formed private key d ID and a decryption box D that successfully opens a non-negligible fraction ε of ciphertexts encrypted under ID. The output of Trace is either "PKG" or "User" depending on which party is found guilty for having crafted D.
Goyal formalized three security properties for A-IBE schemes. The first one is the standard notion of privacy [8] for IBE systems. As for the other ones, the FindKey game captures the intractability for the PKG to create a decryption key of the same family as the one obtained by the user during the key generation protocol. Finally, the ComputeNewKey game models the infeasibility for users to generate a key d (2) ID outside the family of the legally obtained one d The weaker definition of chosen-plaintext security (IND-ID-CPA) is formalized in the same way in [8] but A is not granted access to a decryption oracle.
2. The FindKey game. Let A be a PPT algorithm. We consider the following game, where λ ∈ N is a security parameter:
ID ) 0 otherwise. Here, the adversary A acts as a cheating PKG and the challenger emulates the honest user. Both parties engage in a key generation protocol where the challenger obtains a private key for an identity ID chosen by A. The latter aims at producing a private key corresponding to ID and belonging to the same family as the key obtained by the challenger in the key generation protocol. Such a successful dishonest PKG could disclose user keys without being caught.
A's advantage is now defined as Adv
Note that, at the beginning of the experiment, A generates mpk without revealing the master key msk and the challenger runs a sanity check on mpk.
As noted in [24] , it makes sense to provide A with a decryption oracle that undoes ciphertexts using d ID (and could possibly leak information on the latter's family) between steps 2 and 3 of the game. We call this enhanced notion FindKey-CCA (as opposed to the weaker one which we call FindKey-CPA).
Finally, in the black-box model, instead of outputting a new key d
ID , the dishonest PKG comes up with a decryption box D that correctly decrypts ciphertexts intended for ID with non-negligible probability ε and wins if the tracing algorithm returns "User" when run on d 
The ComputeNewKey game involves an adversary interacting with a PKG in executions of the key generation protocol and obtaining private keys associated with distinct identities of her choosing. The adversary is declared successful if, for some identity that may have been queried for key generation, she is able to find two private keys from distinct families. Such a pair would allow her to trick a judge into wrongly believing in a misbehavior of the PKG.
In the black-box scenario, the output of the dishonest user consist of a key d Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions. We use prime order groups (G, G T ) endowed with an efficiently computable map e : G × G → G T such that:
In such bilinear groups, we assume the hardness of the (now classical) Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem that has been widely used in the recent years. 
For convenience, we use an equivalent formulation -called modified DBDH -of the problem which is to distinguish e(g, g) ab/c from random given (g a , g b , g c ).
3 The Basic Scheme
The scheme mixes ideas from the "commutative-blinding" [5] and "exponentinversion" [36] frameworks. Private keys have the same shape as in commutativeblinding-based schemes [5, 6, 41, 13] . At the same time, their first element is a product of two terms, the first one of which is inspired from Gentry's IBE [21] . According to a technique applied in [24] , private keys contain a family number t that cannot be tampered with while remaining hidden from the PKG. This family number t is determined by combining two random values t 0 and t 1 respectively chosen by the user and the PKG in the key generation protocol. The latter begins with the user sending a commitment R to t 0 . Upon receiving R, the PKG turns it into a commitment to t 0 + t 1 and uses the modified commitment to generate a "blinded" private key d ′ ID . The user obtains his final key d ID by "unblinding" d ′ ID thanks to the randomness that was used to compute R. A difference with Goyal -1 is that the key family number is perfectly hidden to the PKG and the FindKey-CPA security is unconditional. In the key generation protocol, the user's first message is a perfectly hiding commitment that comes along with a witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof of knowledge of its opening. In Goyal -1, users rather send a deterministic (and thus non-statistically hiding) commitment and knowledge of the underlying value must be proven in zero-knowledge because a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm must be simulated (by rewinding the adversary) in the proof of FindKey-CPA security. In the present scheme, the latter does not rely on a specific assumption and we do not need to simulate knowing the solution of a particular problem instance. Therefore, we can dispense with perfectly ZK proofs and settle for a more efficient 3-move WI proof (such as Okamoto's variant [33] of Schnorr [38] ) whereas 4 rounds are needed using zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
Description
Setup: given λ ∈ N, the PKG selects bilinear groups (G, G T ) of prime order p > 2 λ with a random generator g
at random. It defines its master key as msk := x and the master public key is chosen as mpk :
: to obtain a private key for his identity ID, a user U interacts with the PKG in the following key generation protocol.
1. The user U draws t 0 , θ $ ← Z * p , provides the PKG with a commitment R = h t0 · X θ and also gives an interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the pair (t 0 , θ), which he retains for later use.
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof of knowledge fails to verify. Otherwise, it picks r ′ , t 1 $ ← Z * p and returns
3. U picks r
where r = r ′ + r ′′ . Then, U checks whether d ID satisfies the relation
If so, he sets his private key as d ID and the latter belongs to the family of decryption keys identified by n F = d 3 = t 0 + t 1 . He outputs ⊥ otherwise.
Encrypt: to encrypt m ∈ G T given mpk and ID, choose s
Trace: given a purported private key
and an identity ID, check the validity of d ID w.r.t. ID using relation (3). If valid, d ID is declared as a member of the family identified by n F = d 3 .
The correctness of the scheme follows from the fact that well-formed private keys always satisfy relation (3). By raising both members of (3) to the power s ∈ Z * p , we see that the quotient of pairings in (11) actually equals e(g, Y )
s . The scheme features about the same efficiency as classical IBE schemes derived from the commutative-blinding framework [5] . Encryption demands no pairing calculation since e(g, h) and e(g, Y ) can both be cached as part of the system parameters. Decryption requires to compute a quotient of two pairings which is significantly faster than two independent pairing evaluations when optimized in the same way as modular multi-exponentiations.
In comparison with the most efficient standard model scheme based on the same assumption (which is currently the first scheme of [5] ), the only overhead is a slightly longer ciphertext and an extra exponentiation in G T at both ends.
Security
Selective-ID Security. We first prove the IND-sID-CPA security under the modified DBDH assumption (mDBDH). Proof. We show how a simulator B can interact with a selective-ID adversary A to solve a mDBDH instance (
= e(g, g) ab/c ). At the outset of the game, A announces the target identity ID ⋆ . To prepare mpk, B chooses α, γ, t * $ ← Z * p and sets
−t * , and
The adversary's view is simulated as follows.
Queries: at any time, A may trigger an execution of the key generation protocol for an identity ID = ID ⋆ of her choosing. She then supplies an element R = h t0 · X θ along with a WI proof of knowledge of (t 0 , θ). The simulator B verifies the proof but does not need to rewind the adversary as it can answer the query without knowing (t 0 , θ). To do so, it picks t 1
) is returned to A. Note that the above calculation can be carried out without knowing w = log g (W ) or the representation (t 0 , θ) of R w.r.t. to (h, X) and B does not need to rewind A. Challenge: when the first stage is over, A outputs m 0 , m 1 ∈ G T . At this point, B picks r
for the identity ID * . It flips a fair coin d
As usual, B outputs 1 (meaning that T = e(g, g) ab/c ) if A successfully guesses
In the above proof, the simulator does not rewind the adversary at any time.
The scheme thus remains IND-sID-CPA in concurrent environments, where a batch of users may want to simultaneously run the key generation protocol. Also, the simulator knows a valid private key for each identity. This allows using hash proof systems [18, 19] as in [21, 29] to secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks. The advantage of this approach, as shown in appendices A and C, is to provide FindKey-CCA security in a white-box setting.
Unlike the Goyal -1 scheme, the basic system provides unconditional FindKey-CPA security: after an execution of the key generation protocol, even an all powerful PKG does not have any information on the component d 3 that is eventually part of the private key obtained by the new user.
Theorem 2. In the information theoretic sense, no adversary has an advantage in the FindKey-CPA game.
Proof. The proof directly follows from the perfect hiding property of Pedersen's commitment [34] and the perfect witness indistinguishability of the protocol [33] for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation. Since the commitment R = h t0 · X θ and the proof of knowledge of (t 0 , θ) perfectly hide t 0 to the PKG, all elements of Z * p are equally likely values of d 3 = t 0 + t 1 as for the last part of the user's eventual private key.
⊓ ⊔
The original version of the paper [31] describes a hybrid variant of the scheme that provides white-box FindKey-CCA security using authenticated symmetric encryption in the fashion of [30, 40, 27] so as to reject all invalid ciphertexts with high probability. In this version, we only consider schemes with the weak black-box traceability property.
Theorem 3. In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game, any PPT adversary has negligible advantage assuming that the Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Proof. For simplicity, we prove the result using an equivalent formulation of the Diffie-Hellman problem which is to find h 1/x given (g, h, X = g x ). At the outset of the game, A declares the identity ID ⋆ for which she aims at finding two private keys d
(1)
ID ⋆ comprising distinct values of d 3 = t. Then, the simulator B prepares the PKG's public key as follows. Elements h and X are taken from the modified Diffie-Hellman instance (g, h, X). As in the proof of theorem 1,
Queries: in this game, A is allowed to query executions of the key generation protocol w.r.t. any identity, including ID ⋆ . The only requirement is that queried identities be distinct.
-For an identity ID = ID ⋆ , B can proceed exactly as suggested by relation (5) in the proof of theorem 1 and does not need to rewind A. -When ID = ID ⋆ , B conducts the following steps. When A supplies a group element R = h t0 · X θ along with a WI proof of knowledge of (t 0 , θ), B uses the knowledge extractor of the proof of knowledge that allows extracting a representation (t 0 , θ) of R by rewinding A. Next, B computes
To see that the above tuple has the appropriate shape, we note that
Output: upon its termination, A is expected to come up with distinct valid private keys d
3 ) and d
3 ), such that
Given that we must have
We note that, in the above proof, the simulator does not have to rewind all executions of the key generation protocol but only one, when the adversary asks for a private key corresponding to the target identity ID ⋆ (recall that all queries involve distinct identities). Given that the number of rewinds is constant, the proof still goes through when the simulator is presented with many concurrent key generation queries. If other executions of the protocol (that necessarily involve identities ID = ID ⋆ ) are nested within the one being rewinded when dealing with ID ⋆ , the simulator simply runs them as an honest verifier would in the proof of knowledge and calculates the PKG's output as per relation (5) in the proof of theorem 1. Thus, the initial rewind does not trigger any other one and the simulation still takes polynomial time in a concurrent setting.
Adaptive-ID Security. The scheme can obviously be made IND-ID-CPA if Waters' "hash function"
is part of mpk -supersedes the Boneh-Boyen identity hashing F (ID) = g ID · Z. The number theoretic hash function F is chosen so as to equal F (ID) = g J1(ID) · X J2(ID) for integer-valued functions J 1 , J 2 that are computable by the simulator. The security proof relies on the fact that J 1 is small in absolute value and cancels with non-negligible probability proportional to 1/q(n + 1), where q is the number of key generation queries.
When extending the proof of theorem 3 to the adaptive setting, an adversary with advantage ε allows solving CDH with probability ε/8q 2 (n + 1). The reason is that the simulator has to guess beforehand which key generation query will involve the target identity ID ⋆ . If ID ⋆ is expected to appear in the j th query, when the latter is made, B rewinds A to extract (t 0 , θ) and uses the special value t ′ 1 to answer the query as per (6) . With probability 1/q, B is fortunate when choosing j $ ← {1, . . . , q} at the beginning and, again, J 1 (ID ⋆ ) happens to cancel with probability 1/8q(n + 1) for the target identity.
Weak Black-Box Traceability
Theorem 3 showed the infeasibility for users to compute another key from a different family given their private key. In these regards, a decryption key implements a "1-copyrighted function" -in the terminology of [32, 28] -for the matching identity. Using this property and the perfect white-box FindKey-CPA security, we describe a black-box tracing mechanism that protects the user from a dishonest PKG as long as the latter is withheld access to a decryption oracle.
The tracing strategy is close to the one used by Kiayias and Yung [28] in 2-user traitor tracing schemes, where the tracer determines which one out of two subscribers produced a pirate decoder. In our setting, one rather has to decide whether an ε-useful decryption device stems from the PKG or the user himself.
3 ) belonging to a user of identity ID and oracle access to a decoder D that decrypts ciphertexts encrypted for ID with probability ε, conduct the following steps.
a. Initialize a counter ctr ← 0 and repeat the next steps L = 16λ/ε times:
1. Choose distinct exponents s, s
b. If ctr = 0, incriminate the PKG. Otherwise, incriminate the user.
The soundness of this algorithm is proved using a similar technique to [1] . To ensure the independence of iterations, we assume (as in [1] ) that pirate devices are stateless, or resettable, and do not retain information from prior queries: each decryption query is answered as if it were the first one and, in particular, the pirate device cannot self-destruct. Proof. The tracing algorithm points to the PKG if it ends up with ctr = 0. The variable ctr can be seen as the sum of L = 16λ/ε independent random variables X i ∈ {0, 1} having the same expected value p 1 . We have µ = E[ctr] = Lp 1 . The Chernoff bound tells us that, for any real number ω such that 0
Under the mDBDH assumption, we certainly have Adv mDBDH (λ) ≤ ε/2 (since ε/2 is presumably non-negligible). Lemma 1 shows that p 1 ≥ ε − Adv mDBDH (λ), which implies
With ω = 1/2, the Chernoff bound guarantees that
In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game, if D correctly opens wellformed ciphertexts with probability ε, the probability that an iteration of the tracing algorithm increases ctr is at least
Proof. We consider two games called Game 0 and Game 1 where the adversary A is faced with a ComputeNewKey challenger B and produces a decryption device D which is provided with ciphertexts during a tracing stage. In Game 0 , D is given a properly formed encryption of some plaintext m whereas it is given a ciphertext C where C 3 has been changed in Game 1 . In either case, we call p i (with i ∈ {0, 1}) the probability that D returns the plaintext m chosen by B.
In the beginning of Game 0 , A chooses a target identity ID ⋆ and B defines the system parameters as
Then, A starts making key generation queries that are treated using the same technique as in the proof of theorem 3. Again, B only has to rewind the WI proof when the query pertains to ID ⋆ . At the end of the game, A outputs a decryption box D that correctly decrypts a fraction ε of ciphertexts. Then, B constructs a ciphertext C as
where T ∈ G T .
In Game 0 , B sets T = e(g, g) ab/c so that we have C 3 = e(g, h) a/c and C is a valid ciphertext (for the encryption exponent s = a/c) that D correctly decrypts with probability ε. In this case, D thus outputs m ′ = m ∈ G T with probability p 0 = ε. In Game 1 , T is chosen as a random element of G T and C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) has the distribution of a ciphertext produced by the tracing stage and D must output a plaintext m ′ = m with probability p 1 . It is clear that |p 0 − p 1 | ≤ Adv mDBDH (λ) and we thus have
The proofs of theorem 4 and lemma 1 extend to the adaptive-ID setting using the same arguments as in the last paragraph of section 3. As mentioned in the remark at the end of section 3.2 in section 3, proving adaptive-ID white-box security against dishonest users incurs a quadratic degradation factor in the number of adversarial queries. When transposing the proof of lemma 1 to the adaptive-ID model, we are faced with the same quadratic degradation in q and the bound on
The proof of theorem 4 goes through as long as ε ≥ 16 · q 2 · (n + 1) · Adv mDBDH (λ) (so that p 1 ≥ ε/2). Since q is polynomial, this is asymptotically the case since q 2 · (n + 1) · Adv mDBDH (λ) remains negligible under the mDBDH assumption.
The system turns out to be the first scheme that is amenable for weak blackbox traceability against dishonest users in the adaptive-ID sense. Due to their reliance on attribute-based encryption techniques (for which only selective-ID adversaries were dealt with so far), earlier (weak) black-box A-IBE proposals [24, 25] are only known to provide selective-ID security against dishonest users.
As for the security against dishonest PKGs, we observed that, in the FindKey-CPA game, the last part d = t of the user's private key is perfectly hidden to the malicious PKG after the key generation protocol. Then, a pirate decoder D made by the PKG has negligible chance of decrypting ciphertexts where C 3 is random in the same way as the user would. When the user comes across D and takes it to the court, the latter runs the tracing algorithm using D and the user's well-formed key d
3 ) for which d (1) 3 is independent of D. Lemma 2. In the FindKey-CPA game, one iteration of the tracing algorithm increases ctr with probability at most 1/p.
Proof. In an iteration of the tracing stage, D is given
3 = t, for any plaintext m ∈ G T , there is a value d (1) 3 that explains C 4 and it comes that D returns the one chosen by the tracer with probability 1/p.
⊓ ⊔
We note that a pirate device D generated by the dishonest PKG is able to recognize invalid ciphertexts in the tracing stage (as it may contain the master secret x). However, as long as D is assumed stateless, it cannot shutdown or self-destruct when detecting a tracing attempt. Moreover, with all but negligible probability, it will never be able to decrypt such invalid ciphertexts in the same way as the owner of d
ID would. Theorem 5. In the black-box FindKey-CPA game, a dishonest PKG has negligible advantage.
Proof. The dishonest PKG is not detected if it outputs a decryption box for which the tracing ends with a non-zero value of ctr. From lemma 2, it easily comes that Pr[
To secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks and preserve the weak black-box property, we can use the Canetti-Halevi-Katz [15] technique or its optimizations [11, 12] that do not affect the tracing algorithm.
Extension to Gentry's IBE
In this section, we show how to apply the weak black-box tracing mechanism of section 4 to Gentry's IBE. The resulting A-IBE system is obtained by bringing a simple modification to the key generation protocol of Goyal's first scheme [24] so as to perfectly hide the user's key family from the PKG's view while preserving the efficiency of the whole scheme.
The advantage of this scheme is to directly provide adaptive-ID security against dishonest users and under reductions that are are just as tight as in Gentry's system. This benefit comes at the expense of sacrificing the concurrent security of the key generation protocol (as security proofs require to rewind at each key generation query) and relying on a somewhat strong assumption.
Definition 4 ([21]).
In bilinear groups (G, G T ), the q-Decision Augmented Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem (q-ADBDHE) is to distinguish the distribution g, g α , . . . , g
defined as in definition 5
In the description hereafter, the encryption and decryption algorithms are exactly as in [21] . Since the key generation protocol perfectly conceals the user's key family, we can apply the same weak black-box tracing mechanism as in section 4. The resulting system turns out to be the most efficient adaptive-ID secure weakly black-box A-IBE to date.
Setup: given a security parameter λ ∈ N, the PKG chooses bilinear groups (G, G T ) of order p > 2 λ with a generator g $ ← G. It picks h, g $ ← G and α $ ← Z * p at random. It defines the master key as msk := α and the master public key is defined to be mpk := (g, g 1 = g α , h).
Keygen (PKG,U) : the user U and the PKG interact in the following protocol.
θ to the PKG. He also gives an interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the pair (t 0 , θ).
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof of knowledge is invalid. Otherwise, it picks t 1 $ ← Z * p and returns
Then, U checks whether d ID satisfies the relation
If so, he sets his private key as d ID , which belongs to the key family identified by n F = t ID = t 0 + t 1 . He outputs ⊥ otherwise.
Encrypt: to encrypt m ∈ G T given mpk and ID, choose s $ ← Z * p and compute
given a valid private key d ID = (d, t ID ) belonging to user ID and a ε-useful pirate decoder D, conduct the following steps. a. Set ctr ← 0 and repeat the next steps L = 16λ/ε times:
The IND-ID-CPA security of the scheme can be simply reduced to that of Gentry's IBE as shown in the proof of the next theorem. Proof. Let us assume an IND-ID-CPA adversary A in the game described by definition 2. We show that A gives rise to an IND-ID-CPA adversary B against Gentry's IBE.
Our adversary B receives a master public key mpk = (g, g 1 , h) from her challenger. When A makes a key generation request for an identity ID, B queries her own challenger to extract a private key
, t ID and starts executing the key generation protocol with in interaction with A. The latter first supplies a commitment
θ and an interactive WI proof of knowledge of the pair (t 0 , θ). Using the knowledge extractor of the proof of knowledge, B extracts (t 0 , θ) by rewinding A and returns
In the challenge phase, A chooses a target identity ID ⋆ and messages (m 0 , m 1 ), which B forwards to her own challenger. The latter provides B with a challenge ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) which is relayed to A. After a second series of key generation queries, A outputs a bit d ∈ {0, 1}, which is also B's output. It is easy to see that, if A is successful, so is B.
We now turn to prove the weak black-box traceability property.
Lemma 3. In the Adaptive-ID ComputeNewKey game and for a ε-useful device D, the probability that an iteration of the tracing algorithm increases ctr is at least
, where q is the number of key generation queries.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of IND-ID-CPA security in [21] . For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that, in an iteration of the tracing procedure, the probability p 1 that D returns the message chosen by the tracer is significantly smaller than ε. Then, we can construct a distinguisher B for the q-ADBDHE assumption. The distinguisher B takes as input a tuple (g, g α , . . . , g (α q+1 ) . It generates the master public key in such a way that h = g f (α) , for some random polynomial f (X) ∈ Z p [X] of degree q. At each key generation query, B first computes a valid private key d ID = (d, t ID ) for the identity ID, by setting t ID = f (ID) as in the proof of theorem 1 in [21] . Then, in the interactive key generation protocol, A sends a commitment
θ and proves knowledge of the pair (t 0 , θ), which B extracts by rewinding A as in the proof of theorem 6. As in the latter, B replies with a well-distributed pair d
The game ends with A outputting an identity ID * , a private key
and a ε-useful device. In the tracing stage, B first expands the monic polynomial
If D returns the correct plaintext m, the distinguisher B halts and return 1. As in [21] , (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) is a well-formed ciphertext with the encryption exponent
. In this case, B returns 1 with probability ε since D is a ε-useful device. By assumption, the probability that B returns 1 when T is random is significantly smaller than ε. Therefore, B has non-negligible advantage as a distinguisher against the q-ADBDHE assumption.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 7. In the adaptive-ID ComputeNewKey game, any PPT adversary has negligible advantage assuming that the ADBDHE assumption holds.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of theorem 4.
⊓ ⊔
The weak black-box security against dishonest PKGs follows from the information theoretic secrecy of the user's private key element t ID upon termination of the key generation protocol.
Theorem 8. In the information theoretic sense, no adversary has an advantage in the FindKey-CPA game.
To secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks, we cannot use hash proof systems as suggested in [21, 29] . This technique would indeed cause the decryption algorithm to reject all invalid ciphertexts with high probability, which would not be compatible with our weak black-box tracing mechanism.
Fortunately, CCA2-security can be acquired by applying the Canetti-HaleviKatz transformation to a two-receiver variant of the Gentry-Waters identitybased broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme [22] : one of the two receivers' identities is set to be the verification key of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature and the matching private key is used to sign the whole ciphertext.
Our tracing algorithm can be combined with the latter approach since, in the Gentry-Waters IBBE [22] , private keys have the same shape as in Gentry's IBE and one of the ciphertext components lives in the group G T . As already mentioned, the CHK technique does not affect traceability as, upon decryption, ill-formed ciphertexts only get rejected when the one-time signature verification fails. The computational/bandwidth cost of the resulting system exceeds that of the above A-IBE construction only by a small factor.
Extension to Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption
As already stressed in [24, 25] , reducing the required amount of trust in PKGs is an equally important problem in IBE schemes and their extensions such as attributed-based encryption or identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE).
In this section, we thus show how the underlying idea of previous schemes can be applied to one of the most efficient IBBE realizations to date.
The Boneh-Hamburg IBBE
An identity-based broadcast encryption scheme, as formalized in [2] , can be seen as an IBE where ciphertexts can be decrypted by more than one receiver. Syntactically, it consists of four algorithms:
-Setup: given a security parameter and a bound N on the number of receivers per ciphertext, this algorithm outputs a master key pair (mpk, msk). -KeyGen: is used by the PKG to derive a private key K ID for an identity ID.
-Encrypt: takes as input a plaintext m, a master public key mpk and a set S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n } of receivers' identities, where n ≤ N . It outputs a ciphertext C. -Decrypt: takes as input the master public key mpk, a ciphertext C, a set of receivers S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n } and a private key d ID corresponding to some identity ID ∈ S. It outputs a plaintext m or ⊥.
In [10] , Boneh and Hamburg showed how to turn the Boneh-Boyen-Goh hierarchical IBE [7] into an efficient IBBE system with constant-size ciphertexts and linear-size private keys in the bound N on the number of receivers per ciphertext. Their construction was shown to derive from a more general primitive termed "spatial encryption". Its security (in the selective-ID sense) was established under the following assumption introduced in [7] .
(λ) of a distinguisher B is defined in the usual way.
In the following, we use the same notations as in [10] and, for any vector a = (a 0 , . . . , a N ) ∈ Z N +1 p , g a stands for the vector (g a0 , . . . , g aN ) ∈ G N +1 . The description of the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme is as follows.
Setup(λ, N ): given a security parameter λ ∈ N an the maximal number of receivers N ∈ N per ciphertext, choose bilinear groups (G, G T ) of prime order p > 2 λ and a generator g
α . The master public key is mpk = (g, g 1 = g α , g 2 , z, h = g a ) while the master secret key is msk = (a, α).
Keygen(msk, ID): to generate a private key for an identity ID, choose a random r $ ← Z * p and compute
for which the "delegation component" (T 0 , . . . , T N −1 ) ∈ G N can be expressed
, which will be defined below.
Encrypt(mpk, S, m): to encrypt m ∈ G T for the receiver set S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n }, where n ≤ N ,
Expand the polynomial
1. Expand the polynomial
and use its coefficients to compute
where ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n are the coefficients of P (X) (calculated as per (11)).
Recover the plaintext as
To see why step 1 of the decryption algorithm works, one observes that, for any polynomials (X −ID) and P ID (X) = y
0 , the coefficients of P (X) = (X − ID)P ID (X) = ρ n X n + · · · + ρ 1 X + ρ 0 are given by
. . .
. Since the latter matrix is such that
for each private key K ID , the first n delegation components satisfy
Therefore, since ρ = M 1 · y, we have
which explains the transition between relations (12) and (13). To explain the second step of the decryption algorithm, we note that, for each ID ∈ S, the pair
By raising both members of (15) to the power s ∈ Z
A weak Black-Box Accountable Authority IBBE
The idea of the scheme in section 3 applies to construct an IBBE scheme with short ciphertexts and accountable authorities. The syntax of accountable authority IBBE (A-IBBE) schemes extends that of IBBE systems in the same way as the A-IBE primitive extends IBE. The resulting construction goes as follows.
Setup(λ, N ): is as in the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE but the algorithm chooses an additional random group element g 3 . The master public key thus consists of mpk = (g, g 1 = g α , g 2 , g 3 , z, h = g a ) while the master secret is msk = (a, α).
Keygen (PKG,U) : the two parties conduct the following interactive steps.
1. U picks t 0 , θ $ ← Z * p and sends a commitment R = g t0 2 · g θ to the PKG and provides an interactive WI proof of knowledge of (t 0 , θ).
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof of knowledge is invalid. Otherwise, it picks r, t 1 $ ← Z * p and returns
where r ′′ = r + r ′ . Then, U checks whether d ID satisfies the relation
and e(g,
Decrypt(mpk, K ID , C, S): parse C as (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) and K ID as
and compute the decryption key
Recover the plaintext as
Trace D (mpk, K ID , ε): given a valid private key K ID for the identity ID and a ε-useful decoder D, the tracing algorithm proceeds in a similar fashion to previous schemes, by feeding D with ciphertexts C = (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) and the receiver set S. In the generation of C, C 1 and C 2 are calculated as specified by the encryption algorithm. On the other hand, C 3 is chosen as a random element of G T and C 0 is obtained by applying the decryption algorithm to S and (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ).
Correctness is implied the fact that the decryption key (D
and raising both members to the power s as in previous schemes.
To avoid repeating the work of Boneh and Hamburg, we prove the security properties of the above A-IBBE system by reducing them to the IND-sID-CPA security of the underlying IBBE. for the identity ID chosen by A. The latter is turned into an A-IBBE private key and re-randomized by setting
where r ′ $ ← Z * p . The new key K ID is easily seen to have the same distribution as those obtained in step 3 of the key generation protocol. Finally, A obtains the "blinded key"
In the challenge phase, A chooses a pair of target messages (m 0 , m 1 ). The schemes described in [35, 26] can easily be tweaked to support accountability in the weak black-box model.
Conclusion
We described the first A-IBE system allowing for weak black-box traceability while retaining short ciphertexts and private keys. We also suggested a white-box variant that dwells secure against dishonest PKGs equipped with a decryption oracle. In the black-box setting, it remains an open problem to achieve the latter property without significantly degrading the efficiency.
In the setting of hierarchical IBE schemes, it would also be desirable to see how the problem can be addressed. When a pirate decoder is found to decrypt ciphertexts intended for a node, one should be able to determine which ancestor(s) of that node should be blamed.
1. U sends R = h t0 · X θ to the PKG and proves his knowledge of the underlying pair (t 0 , θ) 
where t A = t 0 + t A,1 , r A = r 
If so, he sets his private key as (d ID,A , d ID,B ) and the latter belongs to the family of decryption key identified by n F = d A,3 = t A . Encrypt: to encrypt m given mpk and ID, choose s $ ← Z * p and compute
where
is not a valid authenticated encryption) using the key
with κ = H(C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ).
Trace: given an alleged private key (
for an identity ID, check the validity of d ID w.r.t. ID using relations (17)- (18). If valid, the key is declared as a member of the family
The proof of IND-sID-CCA security is omitted here as it is a standard application of the technique used in [29] , which in turn borrows ideas from [30, 40, 27] .
In the chosen-ciphertext scenario, the white-box FindKey security is no longer unconditional but relies on the (weak) ciphertext integrity property of the symmetric encryption scheme.
Theorem 12. The scheme is FindKey-CCA secure assuming the security of the key derivation function and the (weak) ciphertext integrity of the symmetric encryption scheme. The advantage of an adversary A making at most q d decryption queries is bounded by
Proof. Given in appendix C. ⊓ ⊔
B Authenticated Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme is specified by a pair (E, D), where E is the encryption algorithm and D is the decryption procedure, and a key space K(ℓ) where ℓ ∈ N is a security parameter. The security of authenticated symmetric encryption is defined by means of two games that capture the ciphertext indistinguishability and ciphertext (one-time) integrity properties.
Definition 6. A symmetric encryption scheme is secure in the sense of authenticated encryption if any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in the following games.
1. The IND-SYM game. For any PPT algorithm A, the model considers the following game, where ℓ ∈ N is a security parameter: The notion of weak ciphertext integrity is defined in the same way but the adversary is not allowed to see an encryption c under the challenge key K.
C Proof of Theorem 12
The proof proceeds with a sequence of two games, in which S i denotes the event that the adversary A wins during Game i with i ∈ {0, 1}.
Game 0 : is the FindKey-CCA experiment. The dishonest PKG A generates the master public key, chooses an identity ID that she wishes to be challenged upon. She interacts with the challenger in a key generation protocol, upon completion of which the challenger B obtains a decryption key consisting of two triples d A,2 ) and r B = log X (d (1) B,2 ) (by the construction of the key generation protocol). In the next phase, A starts making a number of decryption queries that the challenger handles using (d 
A,3 +κdB,3
3
, where κ = H(C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ), K = KDF (ψ) and m = D K (C 4 ) which is returned to A (and may be ⊥ if C is declared invalid). At the end of the game, A outputs a key (d
ID,A , d
ID,B ) and wins if d 
. We note that decryption queries on well-formed ciphertexts do not reveal any information to A (since all well-formed keys yield the same result). We will show that, provided all ill-formed ciphertexts are rejected by B, A still has negligible information on t (1) A in the end of the game. For convenience, we distinguish two types of invalid ciphertexts: type I ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) are such that log X (C 1 ) = log F (ID) (C 2 ) (and can be told apart from valid ones by checking if e(C 1 , F (ID)) = e(X, C 2 )), where F (ID) = g ID · Z, whereas type II ciphertexts are those for which log X (C 1 ) = log F (ID) (C 2 ) = log e(g,h) (C 3 ). (20) where κ = H(C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ). Upon termination of the key generation protocol, A has no information on r A , r B (as B re-randomizes its key). Even if κ was the same in all decryption queries (which may happen if these queries all involve identical (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 )), the second term of the product (20) remains almost uniformly random to A at each new query. Indeed, for each failed one, A learns at most one value that is not r A + κr B . After i attempts, p − i candidates are left and the distance between the uniform distribution on G T and that of e(F (ID), X) s ′ 1 (rA+κrB) becomes at most i/p ≤ q d /p. Then, the only way for A to cause the new rejection rule to apply is to forge a symmetric authenticated encryption for an essentially random key K. A standard argument shows that, throughout all queries, the probability of B not rejecting a type I ciphertext is smaller than q d · (Adv We now consider type II invalid queries. While A knows t
B , she has initially no information on t (1) A and the last term of the product (20) is unpredictable to her at the first type II query. Each such rejected query allows A to rule out at most one candidate as for the value t A . After i ≤ q d unsuccessful type II queries, she is left with at least p − i candidates at the next type II query, where the distance between the uniform distribution on G T and that of ψ (calculated as per (20) 
